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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In the last few years, the European integration process has increasingly resorted to flexible mechanisms of 
co-operation and decision-making, involving only a limited number of European Union (EU) Member States. 
The economic and financial crisis itself - and above all the response of the EU to the crisis - has undoubtedly 
favoured the trend.  
These ongoing asymmetric mechanisms deeply challenge the supranational architecture upon which the EU 
experience is based, determining a major change in the formal role and powers of both the European and 
national institutions. In particular, the European Parliament is incapable of adapting its internal functioning 
to the asymmetric schemes. In order to contrast these trends, some hypotheses of reform have been 
formulated, aiming either at building a new institution, a sort of Euro-Parliament; or at adapting the internal 
organisation of the EP to ongoing asymmetric tendencies limiting the voting rights of EPs.  
The essay challenges both these hypothesis, assuming that responding to the increasing asymmetries of the 
EU by making the existing institutions, above all the European Parliament, more asymmetric, would 
consistently endanger the cohesion of the Union and threaten the good functioning of its governing bodies. 
Rather, the approach should be based upon a re-consideration of the overall representative circuit upon which 
the EU is based. This implies that an even more asymmetric EU will have to rely on its traditional channels 
of parliamentary representation: what will need to change is not related to the nature or the format of 
parliamentary representation, but rather to its operative patterns, which should count on strengthened co-
operation among parliaments in order to accommodate asymmetric tendencies in the EU governance with 
flexible forms of interaction in the scrutiny of such procedures. 
 
 
Keywords: multi-speed integration in the EU; asymmetric mechanisms of decision-making among Member 
States; enhanced cooperation; opt-out; new European economic governance; democratic legitimacy of the 
EU; parliamentary democracy; European Parliament; inter-parliamentary cooperation; euro-national 
parliamentary system; parliamentary scrutiny.  
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1.	INTRODUCTION	
 
 In the last five years, the European integration process has increasingly resorted to flexible 
mechanisms of co-operation and decision-making involving only a limited number of European 
Union (EU) Member States. The economic and financial crisis itself – or, rather, the response that 
the EU has provided to the crisis – has encouraged this trend, by enlarging the gap among Euro and 
non-Euro countries and by enhancing new cleavages, based upon the economic and financial 
stability of the Member States. The possibility of asymmetries in the internal functioning of the EU 
can be considered to a large extent physiological. 
Most federal states, in fact, are characterised not only by some de facto asymmetries, resulting from 
social, economic, cultural, geographic pre-conditions, but also by some de jure asymmetries: the 
latter based upon the entrenchment of a series of formal asymmetric institutional devices ending in 
a differentiation of powers or levels of autonomy established by the federal Constitution or federal 
law (Burgess, 2006: 217; Swenden, 2006: 63; Watts, 2008: 127 and 2010: 2). 
It would therefore be illogical to presume that similar trends would not characterise the EU, which 
still establishes its basis upon a form of atypical supranational integration not fully comparable to 
the experience of federal states.1 The presence of de facto asymmetries is indeed intrinsic to the 
origins of the European integration experience, which has, since the beginning, involved countries 
with different political, institutional, economic, social, and cultural features. These original 
asymmetries have intensified over the decades, due to the progressive extension of the European 
domain to new geographical areas whose features are much more differentiated that those of the six 
founding Member States. 
This process, however, was accompanied by an increasing recourse to de jure asymmetries 
(Constantinesco, 1997: 751 ff.; Gaja, 1998: 855 ff.; Hanf, 2001: 3 ff.; De Areilza, 2001: 27 ff.) as a 
potential solution in order to activate also some new policy areas in which unanimous answers were 
not possible. Also due to the ongoing uncertainties regarding the future of the EU – swinging from 
the return to intergovernmental dynamics to the promotion of a more politically-integrated Union – 
variable-geometry mechanisms have been turned into a “second best” option (compared with full 
integration), if not into a potentially-disaggregating factor which hinders the overall institutional 
architecture of the EU. 
                                                 
 
1 On the plurality of compromises (between a supranational union and an intergovernmental union; between Member 
States constituting the EMU and Member States retaining their own national currency) upon which the EU 
constitutional system is based, see Fabbrini, 2014: 2. 
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Constitutional scholars have intensively argued about the effects that asymmetry could cause to the 
stability and harmonic functioning of a federation. The historic original reluctance to differentiation 
(Tarlton, 1965) – based upon the idea that the more symmetrical a federation is, the more 
harmonious and unified it will be, and vice versa – was replaced, over time, by a more general 
preference with regard to asymmetries. Notwithstanding the implicit risk of imbalances and 
inequalities relating to asymmetrical federalism (Kymlicka, 2005: 286), the latter is perceived by 
many contemporary scholars as a positive solution: indeed, it is a solution which seems capable of 
sustaining federal values and structures (Burgess, 2006: 209), inspired by a communitarian principle 
(directed at preserving political communities), by a functional principle (relating to the idea of 
efficiency in managing diverse territories) and by a democratic principle (promoting liberty, 
equality and political participation) (Gagnon and Gibbs, 1999: 78 ff.). It could be stated, as a 
consequence, that “federal political systems are consciously and purposively designed to facilitate 
flexible accommodation for the many diversities which acquire political salience” (Burgess and 
Gress, 1999: 43). 
The debate on the impact of the asymmetries developed in federal experiences can hardly be 
extended to the EU experience. In federations, the existing forms of differentiated co-operation do 
not seem to hinder the role and functioning of federal institutions and decision-making procedures, 
as the latter find a bulwark in the tight connections that link its constitutive units, represented by the 
existence of a central state, and in their common sense of identity (Beauchamp - Dugas - Graves, 
1999: 307 ff.). 
In contrast, the asymmetric tendencies of the EU are developed by recurring to intergovernmental 
dynamics, which, from an institutional point of view, challenge the supranational architecture upon 
which the EU experience is based. Also, from the motivational perspective, some scholars have 
detected in the debt crisis a turning-point in the recourse to differentiated integration, now used as a 
tool “not to spur more inclusive decision-making, but to avoid it” (Gostyńska - Von Ondarza, 
2012), thus challenging the institutional rationale upon which the EU architecture is founded. 
This premise contributes to explain why the present essay addresses the issues of EU multi-speed 
integration by focusing on the impact exercised over the European Parliament (EP) as a channel of 
parliamentary representation. As the EP is meant to represent EU citizens as a whole, some 
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questions arise with regard to the role reserved to this body in multi-speed decision-making 
procedures, which regard only a limited part of the EU territory. Similar doubts concern the 
possibility that, in a normative perspective, the organisation and functioning of the EP could be 
adapted to variable-geometry mechanisms. 
These hypotheses are critically assessed in this essay. A general overview of the ongoing multi-
speed trends is offered in Section 2, while Section 3 focuses on the differentiated integration 
resulting from the so-called new European economic governance. Section 4 continues with the idea 
that increased differentiation in the forms of participation at the EU has ended up worsening the 
democratic legitimacy of the EU architecture. The role exercised by the EP in the procedures 
involving differentiated forms of integration is analysed in Section 5, in order to evaluate whether 
such tendencies have effectively marginalised this representative assembly. Section 6 is meant to 
assess critically the proposals directed to adapt the internal organisation and functioning of the EP 
to variable-geometry mechanisms. Finally, the conclusions presented in Section 7 try to demonstrate 
the insufficiency of a perspective based upon the EP as the exclusive channel of political 
representation able to fulfil the transparency and participative expectations relating to EU decision-
making and to cope with the democratic legitimacy weaknesses of the current experience of the EU. 
 
 
2.	RECENT	TRENDS	TOWARDS	“MULTI‐SPEED”	INTEGRATION	IN	
THE	EU	
 
 The recent enlargement process of the EU, which, in less than ten years, has almost doubled 
its Member States (going from 15 to 28 Member States), has implicitly favoured the development of 
new forms of co-operation and integration involving a limited number of countries. 
Nothing, however, is completely new. The provision of multi-speed mechanisms of co-operation 
and participation represented a recurrent issue in the European discourse, long before the new 
enlargement process and the latest economic crisis (Thym, 2005: 1731 f.). 
On the one hand, from a political perspective, the call for flexible forms of integration has always 
characterised some of the most critical stages of the history of the European Communities and the 
European Union (Jensen – Slapin, 2010). For instance, it appeared in the early 1980s, following 
Margaret Thatcher’s plea for a budget rebate for the UK. In 1997, negotiating the French and 
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German urgent appeal for deeper co-operation among a small group of Member States;2 in May-
June 2005, following the rejection of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe by French 
and Dutch voters (Wohlgemuth - Brandi, 2007: 159 ff.); in June 2008, after the negative Irish 
referendum outcome on the Treaty of Lisbon (Kràl, 2008). On all these occasions, the idea of a 
multi-speed approach was advocated in the political debate as a possible institutional response to 
the European integration processes at stake.3 All these historical precedents seem to confirm the use 
of differentiated solutions as a form of “second best” option against the failures of the processes of 
joint- and homogenous-integration,4 often deemed as a sort of threat in order to convince the more 
reluctant Member States to accept further steps in the integration process. 
On the other hand, focusing on the technical provisions, the possibility of pursuing forms of flexible 
integration among Member States has found three main channels of implementation. 
The first channel is well represented by the experience of the Schengen Agreement: an international 
treaty considered as an example of strict co-operation, in new fields, among some of the Member 
States, initially signed in 1985 outside the European Communities’ legal order by 5 of the then 10 
Member States, and later incorporated into EU law by the Treaty of Amsterdam, to the point that it 
can now be amended by an EU regulation. However, it still excludes 5 EU Member States 
(Bulgaria, Cyprus, Ireland, Romania and the United Kingdom) and includes 4 non-EU Member 
States (Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Lichtenstein). 
A second channel is instead represented by the formal procedures of enhanced co-operation 
foreseen by EU law, introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam and then revised by both the Treaty of 
Nice and the Treaty of Lisbon (Manzella, 2005; Best, 2008: 182 f.). The latter are now disciplined 
by Article 20 TEU and by the Title III - Part IV TFEU, which regulate the conditions under which at 
least nine Member States may resort to enhanced co-operation.5 
                                                 
 
2 As observed by Webber, 2012: 25, “the political history of differentiated integration in the EU has been shaped 
primarily by Franco-German relations”. 
3 The idea of a flexible integration was formally developed in a number of “multi-speed” projects (Webber, 2008), 
drafted at different stages of the European history. It is the case, in particular, of the so called Tindemans Report, 
promoted by Belgian Prime Minister during the first oil-price crisis in the early 1970s; of the Schäuble-Lamers Paper, 
approved by the CDU/CSU parliamentary group of the German Parliament after the adoption of the Treaty of 
Maastricht in 1994; of the Fischer Humboldt Speech, held by German Foreign Minister at the Humbolt University in 
Berlin in May 2000 as a reaction to end of the Cold War and to its impact on the European political geography. 
4 Part of the literature considered multi-speed integration as a suboptimal, yet likely outcome for the EU (Schmitter, 
1996). Some doubts on the concrete feasibility of such a solution were instead raised by part of the economic literature 
(Alesina – Grilli, 1993). 
5 The request is to be addressed to the Commission, which evaluates it and submits a proposal to the Council. The latter 
is to approve it with a formal decision to be adopted through the ordinary decision-making procedure; the Parliament is 
to consent to the proposal, in the format defined by the Commission. 
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A third option, the easiest one, is the so-called “opting out”. The possibility for Member States to 
negotiate certain opt-outs from primary or secondary legislation of the EU has characterised some 
important stages of the European integration. The history of the EU shows quite a large variety of 
opts-out, which are not always fully comparable in terms of the institutional goals pursued and 
procedural standards. However, a common feature can be found in the fact that, through the opt-out, 
Member States tend to exclude their participation in certain policy areas. 
The United Kingdom chose to opt-out of the Social Chapter, negotiated in 1991 and then abolished 
in 1997, which was among the first experiences of this kind. The practice was then marked by the 
implementation of the Schengen acquis, on the abolition of border controls between Member States, 
which saw the United Kingdom and Ireland opt out. The functioning of the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) was also accompanied by the formal opt-outs of the United Kingdom and of 
Denmark (while Sweden, which has not opted out from the euro, has, however, deliberately failed 
to fulfil the criteria for the introduction of the common currency). Apart from the EMU, another 
three opt-outs from the Treaty of Maastricht, respectively concerning the Common Security and 
Defence Policy, the Justice and Home Affairs Pillar and European citizenship, were obtained by 
Denmark.6 The entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam was, instead, marked by Ireland and the 
United Kingdom opting out from the legislation adopted in the area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice.7 
All these three forms of flexible integration have lately experienced a significant expansion at EU 
level. In particular, the possibility of strict co-operation in some fields based upon the adoption of 
intergovernmental agreements or other international law tools have characterised the institutional 
response of the EU to the ongoing economic and financial crises. 
With regard to enhanced co-operation, the mechanism was not enforced for several years. In the last 
few years, however, in compliance with the revised procedure defined by the Treaty of Lisbon, 
three initiatives on issues of divorce for trans-national couples,8 patents,9 and EU financial 
transaction tax (FTT) respectively, have been initiated.10 
                                                 
 
6 On the British opt-out from Maastricht’s Agreement on Social Policy, see Brinkmann, 1998: 239 ff. 
7 The opt-out conditions are now disciplined by the Protocol on the position of United Kingdom and Ireland in respect 
of the area of freedom, security and justice. The Protocol, which excludes any binding effect of the decisions adopted in 
the above-mentioned area on the UK and Ireland, ascribes, at the same time, to the two countries opting-out the faculty 
to opt-in at each successive step, notifying the President of the Council, within three months after a proposal or 
initiative has been presented to the Council, that they wish to take part in the adoption and application of the proposed 
measure. 
8 Council Regulation No. 1259/2010, entered into force in July 2012, which includes 14 Member States. 
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The combination of these two tendencies has resulted in increased chances of de facto opting out for 
Member States: by either refusing to subscribe to an intergovernmental agreement or by declining 
to participate in the forms of enhanced co-operation, EU Member States have the opportunity to 
exercise an opt-out right. In both cases, the exercise of the opt-out option does not preclude, but 
rather implies, the possibility of adhering to differentiated integration later on. 
Moreover, a formal amplification in the resort to opting out was determined by the Treaty of 
Lisbon, which has enabled it in some specific areas of co-operation (Fletcher, 2009: 71).11 
 
 
3.	THE	ENHANCEMENT	OF	FLEXIBLE	FORMS	OF	INTEGRATION	AS	
A	CONSEQUENCE	OF	THE	NEW	EUROPEAN	ECONOMIC	
GOVERNANCE	
 
 The economic and financial crisis which began in 2008 has undoubtedly favoured the pre-
existing EU inclination to undertake forms of differentiated integration. The crisis, in fact, has 
intensified the link between European integration and the single currency, which, in its turn, has 
resulted in increased asymmetries in Member State involvement in the European decision-making 
process. It has enhanced the traditional vocation for multi-speed solutions which has, from the very 
beginning, shaped the history of the EMU.12 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
9 Council Regulation No. 1257/2012, which includes 25 Member States. See also the Regulation No. 1260/2012, of 17 
December 2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection with regard 
to the applicable translation arrangements. 
10 COM(2013) 71 final, Proposal for a Council Directive implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of financial 
transaction tax, approved in 1stst reading with amendments by the European Parliament on the 3rd July 2013. It includes 
11 Member States. 
11 The first area is that of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which, as interpreted by the 
European Court of Justice, is to apply fully to EU institutions and to EU legal domain; Protocol n. 30, however, clarifies 
that domestic legislation in the United Kingdom and Poland, is excluded from the EU jurisdiction; in 2009, also the 
Czech Republic was included in the exclusion. The area of Freedom, Security and Justice has affirmed itself as a second 
privileged ground for variable geometry experiences. Two opts out, from the United Kingdom and Ireland, have, in fact, 
accompanied the shift from unanimous decisions to qualified-majority voting (QMV) in the sector of police and judicial 
affairs (See Protocol n. 21. Both states will be able to opt into these voting issues on a case-by-case basis). Protocol 36 
annexed to the Treaty has recognised the UK to opt out all the police and criminal justice legislation adopted prior to the 
Lisbon Treaty (or none of it). Moreover, the according to the Protocol on the position of Denmark, this country will 
remain excluded from the whole area of Freedom, Security and Justice, with no possibility of opting in. On risks related 
to such provisions, which “ostensibly indicate an outward constitutional stance of isolation towards further and deeper 
integration and have seemed ripe to generate much legal even political incoherence”, Vara - Fahey, 2013. 
12 As observed by Laffan, 2012: 177, “EMU represents one of the most important policy areas not shared by all member 
states and the euro crisis has accentuated the importance of the EMU club”. 
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Member State participation in the new regulatory mechanisms – labelled as “new economic 
governance”13 – is not homogeneous. Some procedures, for example, involve all 28 Member States, 
while others are addressed only to the Eurozone countries. A great part of the EU legislation 
recently enacted in this field specifically refers to the “Member States whose currency is the Euro”: 
that is, to the so-called “Eurozone”, currently composed of only 18 EU Member States. There are 
countries willing to participate in the single currency, but which are incapable of meeting the 
required standards for economic reasons;14 others, in contrast, reject adhering to the Eurozone for 
political reasons.15 Finally, a third category of mechanisms (such as the Fiscal Compact) are, 
instead, agreed upon an intergovernmental basis and voluntarily signed only by some Member 
States. 
Measures falling upon the latter category include agreements negotiated mainly during the 
European Council meetings and reached outside the EU legal order.16 Adopting the traditional 
classification of the main categories of differentiated integration proposed by Stubb (1996: 283 
ff.),17 it would be possible to consider the above-mentioned mechanisms as examples of multi-speed 
integration, in which the avant-garde Member States step forward in some aspects of the 
participation in the EU, leaving the possibility of joining at a second stage open to the others 
lagging behind. In other terms, the purpose of these measures is meant neither to create permanent 
divisions among the Member States, nor to enable Member States to choose freely which aspects of 
European integration to join and foster, as would be implicit in the idea of the Europe à la carte. 
                                                 
 
13 The expression identifies the complex and multilevel set of rules and measures adopted within the context of the 
European Union, usually approved by the EU institutions themselves, but often external to the EU legal order, and 
therefore characterised by an intergovernmental nature, which attributes them to the category of international norms. 
See Chiti, Menéndez, Teixeira, 2012; De Gregorio Merino, 2012; Tuori, 2012. 
14 This is the case, in particular, of Lithuania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. 
15 This is the case of Denmark and the United Kingdom, which have formally opted out of adhesion to the Eurozone. 
Sweden, which is legally bound to enter the Eurozone, has also postponed the decision due to the negative results of the 
referendum on the single currency held in 2003. The EU has declared that it will accept this behaviour only from 
Sweden, but not from the Member States which adhered to the EU in 2004, in 2007 and in 2013. Finally, the adoption 
of the euro is perceived as unpopular also in Poland where the decision requires a formal modification of the 
Constitution. 
16 Examples of supranational norms, adopted through intergovernmental agreements in between Members States, are 
offered by: a) the European Financial Stability Facility, established by the euro-area Member States following the 
decisions taken on 9 May 2010 within the framework of the Ecofin Council; b) the Euro Plus Pact, signed on 24-25 
March 2011 by 17 Euro area countries and by other 6 countries in order to strengthen the coordination of national 
economic policies (which however represents a political agreement deprive of the mandatory nature characterising legal 
rules); c) the Treaty to establish the European Stability Mechanism, originally signed on 11 July 2011 and then, after 
being modified to make it more effective, signed a second time on 2 February 2012 by euro-area countries. On the legal 
nature of these agreements, see de Witte, 2013. 
17 Stubb distinguishes among three categories of differentiated integration: multispeed, characterised by a core of 
Member States starting an experience of enhanced integration, leaving up to other Member States the possibility to join 
it later on; variable geometry, based on a permanent division among Member States; and à la carte, which offers to 
Member States the possibility to select which aspects of the European integration to engage in. 
For a different classification of the various concepts of differentiated integration, see Holzinger - Schimmelfennig, 
2012: 292 ff. For an overview of the existing literature on the subject, see Webber, 2012. 
 8
The crisis, therefore, urged the adoption of legal solutions which enabled a certain degree of 
flexibility in the participation of the Member States in the new economic governance. Such 
solutions were not found in the tools of differentiated integration formally disciplined by EU law 
(specifically, the procedures of enhanced co-operation), but in the traditional intergovernmental 
decision-making mechanisms, which, as such, stand outside the EU legal order. As a consequence, 
it can be argued that the attempts of the EU to foster the integration process even in times of 
economic crisis – which, as such, tend to augment the distance among Member States – have been 
based upon a renewed resorting to intergovernmental procedures and decision-making bodies 
(Chiti, Texeira, 2013: 683 ff.).18 
This choice has been criticised by part of the literature. For instance, some scholars (Fabbrini, 
2013;19 Cantore, Martinico, 2013: 475 f.) qualified one of the most important forms of 
differentiated integration in the EU – to be identified with the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance (TSCG, the so-called “Fiscal Compact”) – as a missed opportunity for enhanced co-
operation, compliant with Art. 20 TEU and Title III - Part IV TFEU.20 The Fiscal Compact, formally 
adopted as an international treaty subscribed by 25 out of 27 Member States (Fabbrini, 2013), can 
be considered a clear example of European flexible integration, substantially ascribable to the 
“emerging” forms of differentiation clearly represented by the Schengen protocol. The Schengen 
experience, in fact, could contribute to describe the future development of the Fiscal Compact, 
which is expected to become part of EU law in the near future.21 
With regard to what concerns the special form of asymmetric integration represented by the 
Eurozone, the relationship between countries inside and outside the Eurozone can, to large extent, 
be attributed to the category of multi-speed integration. All the Member States of the EU are 
required to adopt the euro and join the Eurozone, by meeting certain conditions known as 
“convergence criteria”. An exception has been made for those countries which have “opted-out” of 
joining the euro for reasons of economic sovereignty, but which, in any case, can accede to it in the 
                                                 
 
18 On the exacerbation of the phenomenon of executive dominance in the EU context in response to the economic crisis, 
Curtin, 2014: 1 ff. 
19 Fabbrini (2013: 14-16) has raised some doubts on the appropriateness of the enhanced cooperation mechanism in the 
two cases of divorce and patents, stressing the fact that, ironically, the mechanism would have fitted perfectly to the 
field of economic governance. 
20 On the proceedings that lead to the adoption of the TSCG, see Craig, 2012b. 
21 According to art. 18 of the TSCG, in fact, “Within five years, at most, of the date of entry into force of this Treaty, on 
the basis of an assessment of the experience with its implementation, the necessary steps shall be taken, in accordance 
with the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, with the aim of 
incorporating the substance of this Treaty into the legal framework of the European Union”. 
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future if they so wish.22 This implies that accession to membership in the Eurozone is formally 
made/extended to all EU countries (Gostyńska - von Ondarza, 2012). 
From an institutional point of view, the Euro area, as area of differentiated integration, has seen a 
fairly evident process of the emergence of new institutions, limited, if not in the participation, at 
least in the active involvement of the sole representatives of the Eurozone Member States, such as 
the Euro-group (the meeting of the finance ministers of the Euro area, normally convened in camera 
a day before the Ecofin meetings) and the Euro-summit (also referred to as the “Eurozone summit”, 
which is the meeting of the heads of state or government of the Member States of the Euro area).23 
In summary, the financial and economic crisis has deeply affected the intensity and nature of the 
interaction between the EU institutions and the Member States; it has advocated the adoption of 
institutional mechanisms based upon very close co-operation among national and EU actors, and it 
has called for the integration of national rules, procedures and structures within the EU legal order. 
The response to these emerging needs has significantly transformed the very structure of the EU 
itself, leaving a distinct political, institutional and governance legacy (Laffan, 2012: 173), which 
eventually gave space to the enhancement of more flexible forms of integration (Pernice, 2012; 
Tosato, 2013). 
Moreover, the current economic trend has consistently increased the differences among Member 
States, in terms not only of economic and fiscal performances, but also of the country’s capacity to 
cope with recovery measures (Curtin, 2014: 29). Also from the perspective of the addressees, some 
of the new mechanisms – such as the rescue mechanisms and the rules on bail-outs – are only 
directed to specific European States.24 
                                                 
 
22 Among the other countries excluded from the Eurozone, Sweden has not made the necessary changes to its central 
bank legislation and does not meet the convergence criterion related to participation in the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM II). The remaining States have all joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 and, at the time of their accession, they did not 
meet the convergence criterion. 
23 The so-called Euro-summits represent a forum of leading representatives of the Eurozone countries where issues 
concerning the common currency management are discussed. The discussions often include a debate on the strategic 
guidelines of national economic policies. 
The Summit – first held in October 2008, on the basis of common agreements among Member States – has been 
somehow institutionalised by the TSCG, which requires a minimum of two Euro-summit meetings per year. Following a 
decision adopted in October 2011, the President of the Summit is elected by Eurozone heads of state or government at 
the same time as the European Council elected its President. Its mandate lasts two years and a half. At the moment, the 
office is performed by Herman Van Rompuy, elected as the first President of the Euro-summit on 1 March 2012. 
On the implicit coincidence between the role of President of the European Council and President of the Euro-summit, 
see Hyvärinen in Kocharov, 2012: 14. 
24 It is, above all, those countries belonging to the Eurozone that have agreed upon the adoption of strengthened 
procedures aiming at preventing and promptly manage bailouts on the basis of re-inforced fiscal and macroeconomic 
surveillance and correction mechanisms. 
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As a consequence, these ongoing trends have fostered the idea that the differentiation vogue would 
lead not to a “multi-speed”, but rather to a “two-speed” Europe, in which a given group of Member 
States co-operates crosswise in all policies and areas. Relying on these processes, some authors 
have suggested a further development of “two-speed” Europe, with a leading group of Member 
States attaining further steps of integration through their own common institutional architecture 
(Piris, 2012: 66 ff.). In the contrast, it has been observed (Craig, 2012: 804) that the perspective of 
“two-speed” Europe could not be taken as the most probable, first of all, because there is not, at the 
moment, a fixed group of Member States wanting to lead the integration process, as their interests 
and preferences diverge according to the area considered. Secondly, because the institutional 
architecture resulting from this “two-speed” Europe would seem heavier and even more complex, 
with parallel sets of institutions, than the current one. 
 
 
4.	ASYMMETRIC	EU	AND	THE	WORSENING	OF	THE	DEMOCRATIC	
LEGITIMACY	 PROBLEM:	 A	 CHALLENGE	 FOR	 PARLIAMENTARY	
REPRESENTATION	IN	THE	EU	
 
 The asymmetric mechanisms which characterise the contemporary European architecture 
have determined a major change in the formal role and powers of both the European and national 
institutions involved in the regulatory system as well as in their overall position in EU decision-
making. According to Article 10 TEU, parliamentary representation in the EU is ensured by two 
channels: one embodied by the European Parliament and the other by Member State forms of 
governments and the national parliaments (Micossi, 2008; Lindseth, 2010). Both these two channels 
of parliamentary representation have been affected in their institutional role and functions by the 
ongoing asymmetric tendencies of EU decision-making. 
Of the three above-mentioned forms of differentiated integration in the EU, the second – 
represented by the enhanced co-operation – does not seem to alter the institutional architecture of 
the EU substantially.25 Both in the initial stage of the activation of the enhanced co-operation and in 
the subsequent stage of the functioning of the co-operative mechanism, the European procedure – as 
disciplined by Article 20 TEU, Articles. 329-330-332 and 333 TFEU – involves all the relevant EU 
                                                 
 
25 Looking at the substantive constraints of, and procedural requirements for enhanced cooperation, Thym, 2005: 1737 
ff. demonstrated that they do not contradict the general principles of European law as characteristic features of its 
supranational legal order and highlighted that the general mechanism of enhanced cooperation are integrated into the 
single legal and institutional framework of the European Union, thereby preserving its constitutional unity. 
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institutions, in their ordinary composition, in order to reduce the difference with the ordinary EU 
law-making rules (Fabbrini, 2013). After being evaluated by the Commission, the proposal for the 
activation of enhanced co-operation has to obtain the consent of the Parliament and the 
authorisation of the Council (through ordinary decision-making, based upon qualified-majority 
voting). Once enhanced co-operation has been activated, the Member States involved make their 
ordinary use of EU institutions, including the European Parliament, without bearing additional 
costs. The only variation concerns the special format applied to the Council: all the members can, in 
fact, participate in the decisions to be adopted in the context of enhanced co-operation, but only 
those members which represent the countries formally involved in the mechanism can take part in 
the vote. As correctly observed (Konstadinides, 2009: 251), these rules are based upon the idea that 
“any initiative for a partnership arrangement should rather occur within the structures and 
institutions of the community rather than outside them. This means that any agreement involving a 
certain amount of Member States would come under the Community’s parliamentary or judicial 
scrutiny”. 
A much greater impact on the institutional architecture of the EU is derived from the new European 
economic governance, which can be considered as a combination of asymmetries deriving from the 
first and the third categories of differentiated integration, as they are characterised by resorting to 
both intergovernmental tools and opt-out options. 
The institutional consequences of this architecture resulted in an overriding prevalence of informal 
procedures and practices over the official proceedings and competences (Laffan, 2012). The need to 
adopt quick and intrusive measures has led to traditional procedures being abandoned, and the 
decision-making power of the European Council (Rittelmeyer, 2014: 25 ff.; Alexandrova - Caramia 
- Timmermans, 2014: 53 ff.), whose role is no longer limited to a strategic function,26 the Economic 
and Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin) and of the European Central Bank (ECB), being 
strengthened.27 Other emerging institutions, such as the Eurogroup and the Euro-summit (Borges, 
2012: 7; Laffan, 2012: 177), also come to play a very significant role. Most of these institutions are 
composed only of the governments of the Eurozone Member States, a solution which enables 
variable geometry schemes, and, consequently, makes it possible to cope with asymmetric decision-
making. 
                                                 
 
26 As observed by Leino - Salminnen, 2013: 864, it is difficult to maintain that the European Council, and in particular 
its members, lacks democratic backing. However, its de facto legislative role, combined with the shortage of 
transparency affecting its meetings do represent a problem from a democratic perspective.  
27 Peroni, 2013: 183 ff.; Barbier, 2013: 212 ff. 
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Moreover, the emerging tendency towards bilateralism in the dynamics of political interaction (once 
led by the Franco-German “Merkozy couple”28 and now headed by the Anglo-German discussions 
on the future conditions of Britain’s membership29) has contributed to determine a further expansion 
of the executive branches. This situation has given origin to a new “executive federalism”, which 
still reflects the “reluctance of the political élites to replace the established mode of pursuing the 
European project behind closed doors with the shirt-sleeved mode of a noisy, argumentative conflict 
of opinions in the public arena” (Habermas, 2012: 337). 
This renewed preference for intergovernmental methods, however, seems to endanger the 
supranational architecture upon which the EU is grounded deeply. Scholars have denounced the 
lack of transparency and democratic oversight which characterises both the procedures and the 
solutions of the new economic governance,30 which challenges both the channels of parliamentary 
representation: neither the European Parliament, nor national parliaments, in their respective areas 
of competence, seem to be capable anymore of fully complying with the increasing expectations of 
transparency and democratic oversight over the regulatory mechanisms resulting from 
intergovernmental asymmetric decision-making. 
This happens right at the very moment in which the role of directly-elected assemblies would have 
been more useful: as has been noted, with the “transition from ‘negative’ to ‘positive’ integration”, 
enhanced after the euro crisis, “problems of distributive justice”, regarding social policies, the 
labour market, economic and fiscal policies arise (Habermas, 2012: 347). This leads us to re-
consider the issues relating to the so-called “input legitimacy” as being potentially strategic 
(Schmidt, 2012: 108 ff.; Weiler, 2012: 248 ff.; Nïcolaidis, 2013: 351 ff.31). 
 
                                                 
 
28 As observed by Habermas (2012: 348), in a certain phase, “Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy appear to have 
settled some sort of compromise between German economic liberalism and French statism with a completely different 
intent”, extending “the executive federalism, which is implicit in the Treaty of Lisbon, into an outright 
intergovernmental rule by the European Council”. 
29 Apart from the traditional Franco-German axis of the EU, the recent visit to Britain of Angela Merkel – which took 
place in February 2014 and culminated in the historic speech of the Chancellor (the first after the reunification of 
Germany) to the twin Chambers of Parliament at Westminster - seems to bear witness to the emergence of a new 
dialogue between the United Kingdom and Germany, fostered by the common concerns about the conditions of 
Britain’s membership of the EU and on the Ukraine crisis. 
30 On the problems of clarity affecting the functioning of the EMU structures, whose arrangements can barely be 
grasped by the “common man”, see Leino - Salminnen, 2013: 862. 
31 On the perspective of the so called “throughput legitimacy”, which typically relates to the justification of governance 
modes based upon the quality of procedures, see Schmidt, 2013. 
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5.	THE	EUROPEAN	PARLIAMENT	FACING	THE	CURRENT	TRENDS	
OF	MULTI‐SPEED	INTEGRATION	
 
A large part of the debate on the institutional architecture of the EU tends to interpret its 
ongoing adaptations to external changes as a zero-sum game. This has also characterised the 
dominant approach to the multi-speed integration challenges relating to the Eurozone crisis and the 
new European economic governance. Many scholars have, indeed, emphasised the fact that there 
are institutions, such as the European Council (Wessels et al., 2013: 14 f.) and the Commission 
itself (Smits, 2012: 827 ff.), which are winning. And others, like the Council (Weiler, 2012b: 254) 
and the European Parliament, in particular, which have been losing weight in recent years. 
There are manifold reasons why the European Parliament is supposed to lose power and 
institutional appeal. The first of these reasons relates to the overall marginalisation of traditional 
forms of parliamentary oversight which affect the general shift towards European governance based 
upon intergovernmental, often asymmetric, decision-making dynamics. 
A second reason is specifically linked to the position occupied by the European Parliament in the 
institutional architecture of the EU. It has been argued, in fact, that the European Parliament suffers 
from ongoing asymmetric trends more than the other EU institutions. 
The weakening of the European Parliament can be considered to be the consequence not only of the 
trend towards more intergovernmentalism in the EU, but also, and, above all, of the coming into 
force of new legal constructions (such as the Fiscal Compact) separated from the EU and not 
involving all the Member States (all represented in the EP, by definition). The European Parliament, 
in fact, is incapable of adapting its internal functioning to these asymmetric and government-
oriented decision-making schemes, as its origin and institutional procedures are deeply rooted in the 
so-called “community method”, which the new European economic governance has de jure and de 
facto overcome. 
Also, looking at the formal competences of the body, the constant trend towards the enlargement of 
its functions, which has characterised the institutional path of the European Parliament from the 
Single European Act of 1986 to the Treaty of Lisbon of 2007,32 seems to have lately experienced a 
reversal or at least a stop, which the new European economic governance has emphasised. It has 
been argued that, in particular, in the procedures designed by the so-called “Six-pack” and by the 
Fiscal Compact, the European Parliament has been involved too late; it does not receive the NRP 
                                                 
 
32 On the answers given by the Treaty of Lisbon to the problem of the democratic deficit, see Pinelli, 2008: 925 ff., 
Starita, 2009C; Lord, 2012; Manzella, 2013. 
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(national reform programmes), the SCP (stability/convergence programmes), nor the draft 
budgetary plans directly; it is devoid of decision-making power, as it can neither concur in fixing 
the strategic priorities of the fiscal year and the European Semester, nor review the country-specific 
recommendations once adopted by the Council (Fasone, 2013). As such, the role of the EP is 
formally restricted only to the right to receive information. The strategic priorities are defined by 
the European Council. The European Parliament only needs to be informed on specific occasions 
and consulted on others. 
At the same time, the EP is deprived of concrete and reliable oversight mechanisms, combined with 
the possibility of political and legal sanctions against the decision-makers of the European Council, 
its President and the Eurogroup (Maurer, 2013: 3). As is well known, EU and Eurozone fiscal 
policies, procedures and instruments, such as the European Stability Mechanism and the European 
Financial Stability Facility, are not dependent on the EU budget. Therefore, the European 
Parliament, which approves - together with the Council - the EU budget, is excluded from both the 
decision-making and the oversight of these instruments, which are essential for the EU and 
Eurozone fiscal policy (Maurer, 2013: 2). 
In contrast, national parliaments, although deprived of some of their powers over the definition of 
national budgetary policies, seem to have gained, from the new European economic governance, 
new opportunities for intervention in the multi-level and asymmetric decision-making processes 
(Griglio-Lupo, 2013: 345 ff.), and their active role is strongly needed in a more intergovernmental 
Europe. 
This general overview on the role of the European Parliament does not necessarily imply, however, 
that the institution is now weaker than in the past. 
The relative lack of formal powers has, in fact, been somehow balanced by the attempts of the EP to 
consolidate “soft” powers tools, which have enabled this institution to dialogue with some of the 
key actors of the Eurozone crisis management, such as the President of the European Central Bank, 
the President of the Commission, and the President of the Euro-summit (o Broin, 2012: 233). All 
these meetings take place in the competent EP parliamentary committees. This parliamentary 
practice, labelled under the formula of the “economic dialogue”, is now formally provided for by 
the “Six-pack” and by the “Two-pack”, which, through the introduction of these provisions, have 
                                                 
 
33 The author mentions as another example of ‘soft’ power: the activity carried out by the European Parliament’s ad hoc 
committee on the Financial, Economic and Social Crisis (CRIS), chaired by German MEP Wolf Klinz. 
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tried to respond to the criticism relating to the lack of democracy of the new economic 
governance.34 
In addition, the EP has tried to re-inforce the institutional links with the European Council, by 
promoting, on the initiative of its Speaker, Martin Schulz, a practice of open confrontation on the 
speeches of the EP President, held at the beginning of each meeting of the Council, within the 
Council itself.35 
From a legal perspective, some scholars have correctly argued that the position of the EP has grown 
in importance in the Fiscal Compact, if one considers that the previous versions of the Stability and 
Growth Pact did not even mention the European Parliament (Fasone, 2012; Fasone, 2014a: 164 ff.; 
Cantore - Martinico, 2013: 466). 
Finally, the EP has often played a decisive role in the drafting of some of the fundamental 
normative pieces of the new European economic governance. To wit, it has contributed to shape the 
final text of the “Six-pack”, by limiting the attempts by a number of Member States to weaken the 
automaticity of the new rules (McArdle, 2011; o Broin, 2012: 1). And, in extending the length of the 
exam of the “Two-pack”, it has also managed to influence the negotiations that led to the Fiscal 
Compact. 
 
 
6.	 THE	 IDEA	 OF	 THE	 EUROPEAN	 PARLIAMENT	 AS	 A	 VARIABLE	
GEOMETRY	INSTITUTION	AND	ITS	CONTRADICTIONS	
 
The role of the European Parliament has recently been affected by conflicting tendencies, 
which have led this institution to try to contrast – mostly upon the basis of informal arrangements – 
the ongoing marginalisation of its formal role. However, from a normative perspective, a further 
enhancement of the role of the European Parliament, specifically in the policies concerning the 
Eurozone, has been considered as largely desirable. 
                                                 
 
34 More specifically, the “economic dialogue” is provided by Regulation 1175/2011, which formalised the European 
Semester. On this point, see Tuori, 2013: 45-46. As observed by Hallerberg - Marzinotto - Wolff (2011: 28), in the 
context of the European Semester, the European Parliament should “become a forum in which information is exchanged 
and its role of watchdog for the relationship between the Commission and the Council made more visible and 
effective”. 
35 On this point, see European Parliament - Directorate general for internal policies, 2013: 22-23. See, also, Gianniti-
Lupo, 2012. 
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This perspective, however, has revealed itself to be potentially problematical, at least for the time 
being, for a variety of reasons. 
It has been argued, in fact, that an underlying contraction would accompany any attempt to 
strengthen the role of the European Parliament in the face of the ongoing multi-speed and 
asymmetric decision-making trends, as this assembly represents the EU citizens as a whole and is 
therefore not suited to internally differentiated modes of functioning. 
In particular, a strengthening of the powers of the European Parliament to intervene in the euro-
crisis management would even engage those countries which should not have their say in this policy 
area in the regulatory mechanism, as they do not participate at the EMU. According to some, 
“democracy requires that all those concerned be given a chance to participate. But, arguably, it also 
requires that those not concerned be left without a voice” (Tuori, 2013: 46; Tuori - Tuori, 2014: 
215). 
In order to overcome the above-mentioned objection – which, as we will see, is not devoid of its 
own weaknesses – two main groups of hypotheses have been formulated. The first group aims at 
building a new institution; the second group aims at adapting the internal organisation of the EP. 
The first group includes the proposal, put forward by German MP Michal Roth (Roth, 2011), which 
envisaged the creation of a sort of Euro-Parliament, a parliamentary assembly composed of the 
members of the national parliaments and the MEPs from Eurozone Member States only. In addition, 
the idea, supported, among others, by Joschka Fischer (Fischer, 2012), of creating a Euro-Chamber 
composed exclusively of members of national parliaments (thus going back to the institutional 
architecture of the dual mandate experienced until the first direct elections to the EP of 1979), in 
order to debate and control the measures proposed by the governments of the Eurozone, can also be 
included to this group of proposals. An intermediate position, among these two options, has been 
supported in the Manifesto for Europe, subscribed by Thomas Piketty and 14 others on May 2014,36 
advocating the creation of a European chamber composed of the representatives of national 
                                                 
 
36 The initiative followed other two recent Manifestos, published by German and French intellectuals, which revived the 
idea of establishing a “Political Community for the Euro” to give the single currency a true system of democratic 
governance. In particular, on 17 October 2013, a group of 11 German academics, known as Glienicke group, published 
in the German magazine Die Zeit an essay entitled, “Towards a Euro Union” 
(http://www.glienickergruppe.eu/english.html), which advocated the creation of a Euro-government and a Euro-
parliament. A few months later, a group of French EU experts established the so called “Eiffel group” 
(http://www.groupe-eiffel.eu), publishing, in early 2014, on the daily Le Monde a proposal entitled “Manifesto for a 
Euro Political Union” which pushed for a strengthening of the institutional apparatus of the Eurozone, turning the latter 
into a real political community with a parliament (and a government) of its own  
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parliaments, which would initially involve “only the countries of the Eurozone that want to move 
towards a greater political, fiscal and budgetary union”.37 
A similar position was argued by Renaud Dehousse (2012: 93), who maintained that, if the EP 
insists on defending its unitary character and rejects the establishment of a parliamentary assembly 
representing only the Member States involved in differentiated integration, the latter would react by 
trying to weaken the role of the EP and by addressing national parliaments as the main source of 
legitimacy and representation. 
Among the most significant hypotheses of the second group, there is the proposal put forward in the 
Final Report of the Future of Europe Group of the Foreign Ministers of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain. They suggested 
limiting the voting rights of EPs exclusively to those MEPs elected in the Eurozone countries in all 
decisions applicable only to the Member States already in the Eurozone.38 
These assumptions, and proposals, raise a multitude of doubts and objections. 
The position argued by Tuori seems to contradict its own premises and the legal provisions 
currently in force. In fact, if the European Parliament is meant to represent not each Member State, 
but the European citizenry as a whole (Article 14 TEU), then it is impossible, without altering the 
nature of this institution, to make any distinction based upon the country of election of the MEPs 
(which, as is well known, could not coincide with the Member State of which the MEP is a citizen). 
In the European architecture, the European Parliament plays the role that, in a federal system, is 
entrusted to the lower chamber: it embodies the “one citizen-one vote” principle, which is a 
warranty of equality and democratic representation (Stepan, 1999: 23 f.). In contrast, 
intergovernmental bodies, such as the Council (of Ministers), tend to give voice to the territorial 
components of the EU and, as such, convey a deviation from the above-mentioned principle of the 
“one citizen-one vote”. Any arrangement that alters the institutional ratio of the EP into that of an 
asymmetric chamber in which territorial representation prevails over the “one citizen-one vote” 
principle would result in institutional disequilibrium. Over-representation of territorial interests 
would, in fact, determine a potential breach of the principle of equality. 
                                                 
 
37 As clearly stated in the Manifesto (Piketty et al, 2014), the aim of this “new democratic architecture for Europe” is to 
make it possible “to finally overcome today's inertia and the myth that the council of heads of state could serve as a 
second chamber representing the states”. 
38 The Report, released on 17 September 2012, is available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dorie/cardPrint.do?locale=en&cardId=1275685. The Report, in fact, records that “Most members 
were of the view that, if a decision applies only to the Euro area plus other ‘pre-in’ member states who wish to 
participate already at this stage, ways should be explored to involve the MEPs from these countries (while fully 
respecting the integrity of the European Union and the European Parliament as a whole)”. 
 18
A recent analysis on the voting behaviour in the European Parliament39 has clearly shown that 
political group membership is a stronger determinant of MEP voting behaviour than nationality. 
This implies that the direction of EU policies is first and foremost influenced by the political 
composition of the Parliament and that national affiliation only marginally counts in the definition 
of voting behaviour. 
Notwithstanding this, both groups of proposals do not fail to raise some criticism. 
The first group of proposals, in particular, raises the same kind of problems that have always led to 
the rejection of the attempts to create a new parliamentary institution, representative of the national 
parliaments: essentially, this is a further increase in the institutional architecture of the EU,40 a 
weakening of the EP, flanked by the risk of having the new chamber transfigured into a voice 
against the European integration. 
With regard to the second group of proposals, it is clear that the re-thinking of the internal 
organisation of the EP in terms of variable geometry would hinder the fulfilment of the assembly’s 
representative mission, signalling a backward step in the history of the institution (Kreppel, 2002). 
This approach would implicitly change the very nature of the representative mandate attributed to 
MEPs, as it would transform the EP into a form of territorial chamber, whose members would be 
bound to a sort of mandate from their countries of origin, as in the German Bundesrat – whose 
authentic “parliamentary” nature nonetheless raises some doubts41 – thus falling into the slot which, 
in the architecture of the EU, is already fulfilled by the Council (of Ministers) (Russell, 2000: 9; 
Rodden, 2004: 490 f.). 
The objection has been made that the Euro is the currency of the EU, and not just of the Eurozone. 
As a consequence, any form of legislation which has an impact on the Eurozone should be taken in 
the interest of the Union as a whole (Maurer, 2013: 9). This remark is at the basis of the provision – 
settled by Article 4 para. 5 of the Rules for the Organisation of the Proceedings of the Euro 
Summits, adopted by the Council of the European Union on 14 March 2013 – according to which 
“The Heads of State or Government of the Contracting Parties to the TSCG, other than those whose 
currency is the euro, which have ratified the TSCG, shall participate in discussions of Euro-summit 
meetings concerning competitiveness for the Contracting Parties, the modification of the global 
architecture of the euro area and the fundamental rules that will apply to it in the future, as well as, 
                                                 
 
39 Nissen, 2014: 55. The analysis is referred to the PE legislative mandate 2009-2014.  
40 As observed by Craig, 2013: 808, “the rationale for this duality would be difficult to comprehend as would the 
interrelationship between such bodies”. 
41 For further details on the nature of the representation which the Bundesrat identifies, see Posser, 1994: 1145 f., and 
Rührmair, 2001: 80 f. 
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when appropriate and at least once a year, in discussions on specific issues of implementation of the 
TSCG”. The need to open up participation at the Euro-summits also to the representatives of non-
Euro countries which have subscribed to the Fiscal Compact confirms that the economic and 
monetary regulation is an issue deeply rooted in the destiny of European integration. 
Even economic studies investigating the optimal conditions which could allow some of the member 
countries of a federation to form a sub-union have demonstrated that, in terms of the governance 
rules for the federation, “countries which decided to opt out of the sub-union should however be 
involved in the decision process of the sub-union” (Bordignon - Brusco, 2003: 20). 
At a more general glance, it should be highlighted that it is absolutely normal for national 
parliaments to approve legal provisions which are not applicable to every part of the national 
territory, and thus with the active – and, sometimes, decisive – participation of members elected in 
areas in which the legislation will never produce any effect. This is usually deemed as something 
which does not alter the democratic nature of the national decision-making process. 
Even when the territorial extent of legislation is perceived as a problematical issue due to the 
specific constitutional arrangement of a certain political organisation, any solution aimed at 
differentiating the internal composition or voting of the parliament is clearly seen as awkward. This 
is the lesson that the latest debate on the well-known “West Lothian Question” (sometimes called 
“English Question”: Hazell, 2006) – that is, whether members of the House of Commons elected in 
Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales could vote on matters that affect only England – teaches us. 
The Report on the Consequences of Devolution for the House of Commons, released in March 2013 
by the McKay Commission42 tries to offer a solution to the objection – first raised by Tam Dalylell, 
Member for West Loathian, during the debates on devolution in 1970s, and still to this day 
unanswered – known as “English votes for English laws”.43 
The Commission, in fact, explicitly rejected the creation of a separate English legislature, stating 
that such a solution would produce de-stabilising effects and would, in any case, require a complete 
constitutional reform. At the same time, it also abandoned the “minor” option, which consisted of 
the limitation of the right to vote on those laws likely to have a “separate and distinct effect” upon 
                                                 
 
42 The McKay Commission (TMC) was set up to consider how the House of Commons might deal with legislation 
which affects only part of the UK, following the devolution of certain legislative powers to Scotland, Northern Ireland 
and Wales. The independent Commission was chaired by Sir William MacKay, former Clerk of the House of Commons 
and considered among the maximum experts in parliamentary procedures. 
43 The central issue of the West Lothian Question is to be found in the contradiction according to which “MPs from 
outside England could help determine laws that apply in England, while MPs from England would have no reciprocal 
influence on laws outside England in policy fields for which the devolved institutions would now be responsible”. See 
The MacKay Commission, 2013: 7. 
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England exclusively to MPs representing English constituencies. This proposal, in fact, would 
favour the creation of different “classes” of MPs and lead to potential “deadlock”, as the majority of 
English MPs might not coincide with the majority that supports the government. Finally, the 
Commission also highlighted the vagueness of the “separate and distinct effect” formulation, 
arguing that the application of such a criterion would undoubtedly be controversial.44 As a result, 
the Commission suggested a “partial, practical workaround to a problem created by a disjointed set 
of constitutional changes” (Elliott, 2013), based upon the idea that English MPs should be heard 
and considered on those bills liable to have “a separate and distinct effect” upon England (for 
instance, by creating a Grand Committee consisting of all the MPs representing the relevant 
constituencies which could render an opinion), but without any power of veto. 
The conclusions of the MacKay Commission can be usefully referred to the above-mentioned 
hypothesis of differentiation in the internal composition and voting of the European Parliament 
based upon the country of origin of MEPs. It has been remarked that the transposition of the West 
Lothian question to the European Parliament would be even more difficult (Fasone, 2014b). 
Finally, a legal reason against the proposals for an asymmetric functioning of the European 
Parliament can be found in the experience of the enhanced co-operation procedures as disciplined 
by the Treaty of Lisbon. As previously observed (Section 4 above), Member States participating in 
enhanced co-operation do, in fact, make regular use of EU institutions.45 
 
7.	CONCLUSIONS:	FACING	FLEXIBLE	INTEGRATION,	A	CHALLENGE	
WHICH	 REPRESENTATIVE	 ASSEMBLIES	 SHOULD	 EMBRACE	
TOGETHER	
 
 For a long time, scholarship has advocated an improvement in the quality of political 
representation and in the circuit of accountability for the European experience, which has been 
                                                 
 
44 The problem clearly emerged in the discussion on the Legislation (Territorial Extent) Bill, a Private Member’s Bill, 
promoted by Harriet Baldwin and considered in Committee on March and April 2011, whose aim was to implement the 
principle of the “English votes for the English Laws” by providing that each draft primary and secondary legislation 
shall contain a statement setting out its legal effect on each nation of the United Kingdom. In developing this solution, 
the Bill highlighted the concern that a bill may formally apply only to a nation, but, for instance, by depressing public 
expenditure there, may at the same time produce an indirect impact on the other nations. The problem was solved by the 
Legislation (Territorial Extent) Bill by providing that draft legislation should be accompanied by a financial 
memorandum, which will show the financial effects on each nation. 
45 Member States participating at the enhanced co-operation can in fact make use not only of representative bodies, such 
as the European Parliament and the Council (of Ministers), but also of other institutions, such as the European Court of 
Justice. On the different impact that the differentiated integration respectively on majoritarian and non-majoritarian 
institutions, see Dehousse, 2013: 92 f. 
 21
described as being “stretched in opposite directions by the centripetal forces of integration and the 
centrifugal pull of regionalism” (Downs, 1999: 90). These remarks seem to acquire new relevance 
in the contemporary framework, characterised by increasing complexity, ongoing pulses to 
differentiated integration and sharpened cleavages among Member States. An improvement in the 
democratic legitimacy circuit is universally expected also in order to rescue the European 
Parliament from the burden of the often unpopular choices devolved upon its responsibility. 
Responding to the increasing asymmetries of the EU by making the existing institutions, above all 
the European Parliament, more asymmetric, would consistently endanger the cohesion of the Union 
and threaten the good functioning of its governing bodies. This is the argumentation developed in 
the previous sections. The comparison with federal experiences in particular proved that the 
institutional architecture of the EU should be based upon a balanced combination of territorial and 
unitary elements, as happens in federal states. A consistent variation in the institutional ratio and 
internal functioning of the European Parliament would substantially alter the democratic nature of 
the representative dimension of the EU, endangering the principle of the “one person-one vote” 
which this assembly embodies as well as the prohibition of a binding mandate, on which the 
political representation is founded. 
This idea leads us to re-consider the overall representative circuit upon which the EU is based. In 
particular, it suggests a reflection upon the compound nature of the democratic representation of the 
EU, based upon a double channel of parliamentarism and upon the intervention of a multitude of 
intergovernmental bodies more or less directly related to elected assemblies. 
The stratified and composed nature of the representative dimension of the EU – well depicted by the 
image of the “multi-level parliamentary field” (Crum - Fossum, 2009: 249 ff.) or by the idea, albeit 
slightly different from the former, of the euro-national parliamentary system (Manzella - Lupo: 
2014) – looks like a fundamental point of reference when one reflects upon the institutional 
solutions to be advocated in order to face the current trends of the EU. In particular, it is not 
possible to entrust the institutional burden of representing European citizens and of oversighting the 
activity of the EU fragmented executive (Curtin: 2014) to one single body. The EP itself, 
notwithstanding its direct democratic legitimacy, is not capable of managing this situation on its 
own. Its unitary institutional mandate and representative function render it ill-suited to asymmetric 
solutions aiming at differentiating its organisational and functional standards according to the nature 
and the territorial extension of the decisions to be taken. 
A possible response to the challenges that the perspective of differentiated European integration 
raises may, instead, be found in the further development of co-operation and interaction among 
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representative levels and bodies, which can be pursued by combining different forms of democratic 
participation. 
Representative parliaments can, in fact, take advantage of a multitude of more or less formally 
disciplined procedures and powers. For national parliaments, the reference is, in particular, to the 
“early warning mechanism” (EWM) and to the “political dialogue”, both of which directly involve 
the representative assemblies of the Member States in an “early” making of EU draft legislation.46 
These tools may acquire growing relevance as collective instruments for the democratic oversight 
of the EU decision-making process. As correctly observed, “with their new powers under the EWM 
national parliaments have in effect become a collective actor within the EU”, a sort of “virtual third 
chamber” (Cooper, 2012: 441 f.). 
The practical implementation of these tools and procedures, however, tend to differ substantially 
from parliament to parliament, as only part of national representative assemblies have been able to 
exploit their participative opportunities in EU affairs fully in the latest period (Höing, 2013: 255 ff.; 
Neyer, 2014: 126). Moreover, the scrutiny activity carried out by national parliaments finds its main 
institutional reference in the national executive branch and, as such, is incapable of fully covering 
the range of action of EU decision-making procedures and institutions.47 
This remark helps to explain why the intervention of national parliaments must be co-ordinated and 
possibly integrated with that of the EP.48 
The European Parliament, in fact, can positively contribute to the dimension of early collective 
scrutiny embodied by the national parliaments: through the economic dialogue and the practice of 
open confrontation, the European Parliament has the opportunity to be involved at the very 
beginning of the decision-making process, also participating in those procedures in which only a 
limited part of the Member States are involved. The information acquired and the position assumed 
at these stages of European decision-making could be effectively confronted with those of the 
national parliaments, in order to create a network of representative assemblies capable of sharing, if 
                                                 
 
46 Scholars have widely debated on the nature (Kiiver, 2008; Eriksen 2009: 224-8) and on the institutional consequences 
of the EWM (Maurer, 2008; Raunio, 2010; Piris 2010). 
47 A study on the different modes of national involvement in the exercise of the EU scrutiny activity has been carried 
out by Auel et al. within the OPAL project (see the results of the project cited in Auel - Höing, 2014). The study reveals 
that only a minority of Parliaments try to develop a direct dialogue with the EU institutions, and specifically with the 
EU Commission, through the political dialogue and the participation at the early warning mechanism. The majority of 
national Parliaments, in fact, directs their scrutiny activity at national governments. 
48 This perspective is now favoured by the belief that the economic and financial crisis has shared between the EP and 
NPS a common concern on the risk of a marginalisation of the role of elective assemblies in the governance circuit. On 
this point, see the Annual Report 2012 of the European Parliament “Interparliamentary relations between the European 
Parliament and national Parliaments under the Treaty of Lisbon”, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/webnp/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/Publications/Annual%20report/11900%20Annual
%20Report%202012_EN_lowres.pdf. 
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not co-ordinating, their scrutiny behaviour and positions. The multiple forms of co-operation that 
this perspective offers are particularly suited to offering a solution to the institutional challenges 
that an asymmetric Europe raises. 
Aside these procedures and tools, it could not be underestimated – as a fundamental component of 
the multilevel parliamentary field – the inter-parliamentary co-operation (IPC) which, in its multi-
faceted manifestations, could more easily adapt to the flexibility expectations stemming from 
ongoing asymmetries. 
There are many formats of IPC, which can be collected around two main models. A first model, 
well represented by the COSAC experience, seems to result in the creation of an ad hoc Grand 
Committee, in which all competent representatives of national parliaments are given the chance to 
participate. A second model is identified by the European Convention,49 which could be summoned 
to draft a new EU Treaty and which is composed, among others, of national MPs and MEPs.50 
The recent creation of the “Conference for Economic and Financial Governance” (Kreilinger, 
2013), enshrined by Article 13 of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance – which 
combines features of both formats of IPC –, as well as the Interparliamentary Conference for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP), set up in April 2012 (Wouters, 2014), show that the dialogue among parliaments is 
addressed at the growing expectations and new tasks in European governance (Manzella, 2012; 
Esposito, 2014: 133 ff.). At the same time, however, the first steps of this Conference seem to 
confirm most of the contradictions of the current forms of IPC, as they are unable to cope with the 
asymmetries among the Member States and lack the capacity to adopt binding decisions (Lupo, 
2014: 113 ff.). 
These remarks confirm that the co-operation among national parliaments and the EP should change 
its institutional conception and start to be considered as an opportunity not only to exchange 
information and best practices, but also to co-ordinate respective positions and co-determine future 
                                                 
 
49 On the positive impact that the Convention method exercises over the legitimacy of the EU treaty-making, see 
Fossum, 2005: 143 ff.; Risse-Kleine, 2008; on the results achieved through the Convention format on the ground of 
inclusiveness, participation and involvement of different institutional actors, see Closa, 2003; Bourne, 2006. 
50 The procedure is now disciplined by Article 48 of the TEU. Any Member State, the European Parliament or the 
Commission may submit to the European Council proposals for the amendment of the Treaties. The Council forwards 
such proposals to the European Council. NPs must be notified. If the European Council agrees to examine the 
proposals, a Convention composed of representatives of the national Parliaments, the Heads of State or Government of 
the Member States, the European Parliament and the Commission is convened by the President of the European 
Council. The Convention shall adopt by consensus a recommendation to an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). 
Alternatively, the European Council may decide by a simple majority, with the consent of the European Parliament, not 
to convene a Convention; in this latter case, the European Council itself, through its President, convenes an IGC by 
defining the terms of reference of its activity. 
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arrangements of mutual interest. With all its weaknesses and failures, IPC can still play a 
fundamental role as a facilitator, which could help both channels of parliamentary representation 
effectively to meet the challenges that affect their role and their participation in the multi-level 
decision-making process. 
Examples of the potential role that IPC can play at European level can be drawn by focusing on the 
functioning of the new European economic governance. Both the EP and national parliaments could 
take advantage of the existing conferences - in particular, the Conference of the Speakers of 
European Union Parliaments and the new Conference for Economic and Financial Governance - as 
a place where the positions adopted or to be adopted at domestic level with regard to some core 
stages of the governance mechanism can be pooled. For instance, the strategic decisions entitled to 
the Board of Governors of the ESM by Article 5.6 of the Treaty establishing the European Stability 
Mechanism - directed to the disbursement of financial assistance to beneficiary Member States which 
are experiencing, or are threatened by, severe financing problems - could be put on the agenda of such 
Conferences in order promote a common discussion on respective parliamentary directions issued at 
national levels. The same could be done with regard to parliamentary decisions referred to the 
implementation, in compliance with the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance, of the 
so-called “correction mechanism”. 
Such examples clearly show that existing tools of IPC could be thought of as “federal” devices 
which offer the possibility of confronting and co-ordinating parliamentary policies on specific EU 
affairs, based upon the assumption that such policy-pooling would not endanger the sovereignty that 
each representative assembly exercises over its field of action,51 and would not alter the possibility 
of national parliaments tailoring their approaches to the management of EU affairs (which, even in 
the fields covered by the new European economic governance, tends to vary consistently among 
Member States – Fasone, 2014c). Instead, a proactive use of IPC tools could reproduce at European 
level, in the parliamentary direction and oversight of executive’s decisions, the praxis of co-
operation and policy co-ordination which is typical of a model of co-operative federalism. 
So far, the overall functioning of IPC has been shaped as a form of international co-operation 
among legislatures (Šabič, 2008: 255 ff.; Kissling, 2011), characterised by loose relations, lack of 
continuity and of binding power. The latest developments of European integration, however, make it 
necessary - in order to promote the well functioning of the democratic circuit of responsibility and 
                                                 
 
51 As correctly observed in a normative approach to the issue (Schäfer - Schulz, 2013), even though inter-parliamentary 
co-operation “can contribute to the parliamentarisation of Europe, the responsibility for democratic legitimisation of 
political decision-making remains with those actors whose central task this is: parliaments at national level and the 
European parliament”. 
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to grant effectiveness to policy implementation52 - to develop patterns of “federal” co-operation 
among parliaments in order to legitimate and to permit oversight of decisions taken by the Euro-
national executive branch. 
This instrumental role of IPC – as a dimension that can contribute to build up patterns of 
precautionary co-ordination among representative assemblies in the exercise of their participatory 
rights in EU affairs – explains the limits of this experience which can be developed only within the 
powers conferred on legislatures53 and which is not designed to create a completely new 
autonomous parliamentary level. 
This implies that an even more asymmetric EU will have to rely on its traditional channels of 
parliamentary representation for the fulfilment of its requirements of democratic legitimacy, 
confrontation and scrutiny. What will need to change is not related to the nature or the format of 
parliamentary representation, but rather to its operative patterns, which should count on 
strengthened co-operation among parliaments in order to accommodate asymmetric tendencies in 
the EU governance with flexible forms of interaction in the scrutiny of such procedures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
52 It has been argued (Martin, 2000: 184) that institutionalised legislative participation increases the credibility of states' 
commitments: “States where those responsible for implementing agreements, whether in the national parliament or in 
regional governments, are involved in the negotiation process have better records of implementation”. 
53 The constitutional jurisprudence of many federal experiences has clearly stated that cooperation cannot disregard the 
legal distribution or power nor can be developed among subjects deprive of formal titles for the exercise of that 
competence. Among others, see for instance the case Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally ruled by the High Court of 
Australia, which, although recognising the limits of cooperation ("Where constitutional power does not exist, no cry of 
co-operative federalism can supply it. If the object lies outside the reach or the effect of what a State or the 
Commonwealth can constitutionally do, the subject matter is beyond the reach of the legislatures of Australia" -  Re 
Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) HCA 27; 198 CLR 511, at 55), stated at the same time that "There is no doubt that, as 
a result of co-operation between a State and the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth may achieve objects that are 
beyond the constitutional competence of the Commonwealth. Similarly, as the result of joint legislation, a State and the 
Commonwealth may achieve an object that neither could achieve by its own legislation".  
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